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Insignificant or ignored? 
Antisocial behaviour in private housing in 
Hong Kong
Because of aggravating antisocial behaviour (ASB) or the 
neighbourhood problem in housing, many western gov‑
ernments have given ASB control a central place in their 
policy agendas. However, tackling ASB often involves a 
great deal of politics. Although ASB and controlling it 
have attracted much scholarly attention, the focus has 
almost always been placed on social housing. It is unclear 
whether this problem does not exist in other types of 
housing or if it is simply ignored. Drawing on a study of 
private housing developments in Hong Kong, this article 
examines the extent and seriousness of ASB as a problem 
in private housing. It shows that the problem does raise 
wide concerns among residents, and that many residents 
complain about noise nuisances and littering in their liv‑
ing places. On the other hand, most residents feel that the 
efforts of housing management agents in countering the 
problem are in vain or inadequate. In fact, when react‑
ing to ASB, housing managers inevitably face a number 
of issues that originate from the joint appointment of 
managers by all homeowners and the lack of enforcement 
powers. In particular, controlling some neighbourhood 
nuisances is difficult and costly. This article concludes 
with an agenda for empirical research to explain the pro‑
liferation of ASB from the transaction‑cost perspective.
Key words: antisocial behaviour, neighbourhood nui‑
sances, private housing, residents’ perceptions, Hong 
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1 Introduction
Enjoyment of a quality living environment is critical for all 
residents. However, the quality of housing is not only based on 
its design and the quality of construction. Residents’ wellbeing 
in housing is largely contingent on the outcomes of housing 
management (Yau, 2010). Apart from residents’ inactivity in 
building care and the agency problem in housing management, 
unacceptable behaviour by the residents themselves is another 
common issue that degrades the liveability of a residential 
neighbourhood. Residents’ unacceptable behaviour is com‑
monly referred to as antisocial behaviour (ASB) in Australia 
and the UK, but also referred to as incivility, social disorder, 
neighbourhood nuisances and quality‑of‑life crimes in other 
jurisdictions. Common ASBs include noise nuisances, litter‑
ing, graffiti, abusive uses of communal space, irresponsible 
pet ownership and other acts of vandalism. The gravity of the 
problem has been vividly evidenced by the increasing number 
of complaints and growing dissatisfaction of residents with 
their residential neighbourhoods (e.g., Scottish Government 
Social Research, 2007; Criminal Justice Inspection Northern 
Ireland, 2008). The consequences of ASB can range from re‑
duced housing satisfaction and negative impacts on physical 
and mental health to damage to social stability (Pacione, 1982; 
Curtis et al., 2004; Agyemang et al., 2007; Jacobson et al., 
2008).
In the last decade, the problem of ASB has gained growing at‑
tention from policymakers, housing authorities, residents and 
academics in western countries. To address the issue, various 
measures such as injunctions, ASB orders, parenting orders, 
acceptable behaviour contracts, probationary tenancies, neigh‑
bourhood wardens and family intervention schemes have been 
devised in various jurisdictions. Although the effectiveness of 
these measures varies, it is evident that ASB control is ten‑
ure‑biased even though ASB problems and disputes between 
neighbours are tenure‑neutral in nature (Scott & Parkey, 1998; 
Flint & Nixon, 2006). In many cases, social‑housing tenants, 
and not residents in other types of housing, are subject to the 
control. One study (Carr & Cowan, 2006) argues that identi‑
fying social housing as dangerous and productive of ASB is in 
fact a self‑fulfilling prophecy. This author (Yau, 2011a) states 
that ASB also takes place in other types of housing tenure. 
Therefore, without any concrete evidence of the insignificant 
ASB problem in non‑social‑housing sectors, it is a misplaced 
assumption that ASB is a social‑housing problem.
In Hong Kong, ASB was not an agenda item before 2003. After 
the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 
in early 2003, the government of Hong Kong decided that 
certain ASB or unacceptable behaviour by the residents could 
result in unhygienic conditions that in turn became the hot‑
bed for epidemics. Therefore, a series of initiatives were taken 
by the government such as stepping up enforcement against 
behaviour that jeopardises community health such as spitting 
and deliberate littering in public areas (Team Clean, 2003). 
In addition, the Marking Scheme for Tenancy Enforcement 
in Public Housing Estates was implemented in August 2003, 
with the stated aim of improving the hygienic and living condi‑
tions in public housing estates in the territory. It is essentially 
a kind of control of ASB in housing. However, such control 
is discriminatory because only tenants in public rental hous‑
ing are subject to the marking scheme. It is of no relevance 
to people in other types of housing tenure. In fact, nearly all 
literature on ASB in housing focuses on public or social hous‑
ing. It is unclear whether the problem does not exist in other 
types of tenure or is simply ignored. Drawing on an empirical 
study on private housing developments in Hong Kong, this 
article examines the extent and seriousness of ASB problems 
in private housing.
The remainder of this article is organised as follows: a global 
overview of ASB problems is given in Section 2. This is fol‑
lowed by the design and findings of a questionnaire survey in 
Hong Kong in Section 3. Section 4 presents an analysis on the 
determinants of residents’ intolerance towards ASB in their liv‑
ing places. The difficulties in managing ASB in private housing 
are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper and 
sets out an agenda for further research.
2  An overview of ASB problems 
worldwide
The rising concerns about neighbourhood problems or ASB 
in housing may be attributed to the large numbers of com‑
plaints about various types of ASB. For example, approxi‑
mately 25% of the population of Australia have complained 
about vandalism such as graffiti and damage to property in 
their neighbourhoods (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2006). 
In Northern Ireland, 101,561 incidents of ASB were reported 
in 2006/07  (Criminal Justice Inspection Northern Ireland, 
2008). In 2009, the American Housing Survey revealed that 
about 25.4 million and 9.8 million occupied housing units 
in the U.S. suffered from typical problems of noise and litter, 
respectively (United States Census Bureau, 2010).
In spite of the prevalence of ASB problems, “ASB” is a term 
that lacks a universal definition (Millie, 2009). Its definition 
varies with the defining body and situation. For example, the 
Chartered Institute of Housing (1995) defined ASB as acts 
conducted in opposition to society’s norms and accepted 
standards of behaviour. ASB was defined by the Local Gov‑
ernment Information Unit (1997: 5) as “behaviour that causes 
harassment to a community; amounts to antisocial criminal 
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conduct, or is otherwise antisocial; disrupts the peaceful and 
quiet enjoyment of a neighbourhood by others; intimidates a 
community or section of it.”
Alternatively, ASB in the Residential Tenancies Act 2004 in 
Ireland was broadly defined as behaviour
that constitutes the commission of an offence, being an offence the 
commission of which is reasonably likely to affect directly the well‑be‑
ing or welfare of others … that causes or could cause fear, danger, 
injury, damage or loss to any person living, working or otherwise law‑
fully in the dwelling concerned or its vicinity and, without prejudice 
to the generality of the foregoing, includes violence, intimidation, 
coercion, harassment or obstruction of, or threats to, any such person 
… persistently … prevents or interferes with the peaceful occupa‑
tion by any other person residing in the dwelling concerned, of that 
dwelling; by any person residing in any other dwelling contained in 
the property containing the dwelling concerned, of that other dwell‑
ing; or by any person residing in a dwelling in the vicinity of the 
dwelling or the property containing the dwelling concerned, of that 
neighbourhood dwelling. (Candy Murphy and Associates, 2007: 6)
Similarly, the police in Western Australia have defined ASB 
as any “behaviour that disturbs, annoys or interferes with a 
person’s ability to go about their lawful business” (McAtam‑
ney & Morgan, 2009: 1). In another definition (Millie et al., 
2005: 3), ASB is behaviour that “causes harassment, alarm or 
distress to individuals not of the same household as the per‑
petrator, such that it requires interventions from the relevant 
authorities; but criminal prosecution and punishment may be 
inappropriate because individual components of the behaviour 
are not prohibited by the criminal law or in isolation constitute 
relatively minor offences”.
From the above, it is clear that the definition of ASB can be 
rather elastic and there has been a blurring of the boundary 
between criminal and non‑criminal acts in delineating the 
scope of ASB  (Brown, 2004). In Hong Kong, the govern‑
ment has never used the term “ASB”. Instead, those misdeeds 
defined as ASB in other countries are commonly referred as 
neighbourhood nuisances in Hong Kong. Before 2003, there 
was no clear and consolidated policy to control ASB in the 
city, and ASB was dealt with in a rather piecemeal and ad‑hoc 
manner, mainly by statutory means. For example, noise nui‑
sances in residences and deliberate littering in public places 
were regulated by the Noise Control Ordinance and Fixed 
Penalty (Public Cleanliness Offences) Ordinance, respectively. 
Some other incivilities such as drunkenness, graffiti, vandalism 
and throwing objects from heights were regulated under the 
Summary Offences Ordinance.
The outbreak of SARS in 2003, which claimed 299 lives in 
Hong Kong, aroused public concern about public cleanliness 
in high‑density urban areas. To improve environmental hy‑
giene, the Hong Kong government set up an inter‑departmen‑
tal taskforce, the Team Clean, in May 2003. The Team Clean 
taskforce was chaired by the chief secretary for administration, 
and key departments involved included the Buildings Depart‑
ment, the Food and Environmental Hygiene Department, the 
Home Affairs Department and the Housing Department. One 
of the recommendations made by the Team Clean was to step 
up enforcement against the public housing tenants that repeat‑
edly breached the health codes. Following this recommenda‑
tion, the Hong Kong Housing Authority implemented the 
Marking Scheme for Tenancy Enforcement in Public Hous‑
ing Estates in August 2003, with the stated aim of improving 
the hygienic and living conditions in public housing estates 
in the territory (Team Clean, 2003). The scheme operated as 
a penalty‑point system in which sitting tenants would receive 
penalty points for committing the prescribed misdeeds, and 
would be expelled from their public housing units if their pen‑
alty points accumulated up to a certain level.
Nevertheless, the marking scheme has been criticised for its 
low acceptability, unfairness and negative social impacts (Yau, 
2011a, 2011b, 2011c). More importantly, it is a kind of ten‑
Figure 1: a) New Town Plaza in Shatin, b) Tai Po Centre in Tai Po (pho-
to: Yung Yau).
a
b
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ure‑biased control, with the tenants living in public rental 
housing (including interim housing) being the only subject 
of the regulation. As a matter of fact, this selective control 
is not justified unless it is proven that ASB problems in the 
non‑social‑housing sectors (e.g., subsidised home ownership 
and private housing sectors) are not serious. Although ASB 
incidents in private housing can occasionally be seen from 
the government and news reports (e.g., Information Services 
Department, 2009; Chiu, 2011), there has been no scientific 
study on the extent of ASB problems in Hong Kong’s non‑so‑
Table 1: Distribution of respondents by socio-demographic characteristics
Characteristic* (0) Tenants (1) Owner-occupiers  Overall
n % n % n  %
Sex (MAL)
(= 1) Male 33 58.9  143 61.9  176 61.3 
(= 0) Female 23 41.1  88 38.1  111 38.7 
Age (AGE)
(= 1) 18–24 years old 7 12.5  11 4.8  18 6.3 
(= 2) 25–34 years old 8 14.3  33 14.3  14 14.3 
(= 3) 35–44 years old 11 19.6  68 29.4  79 27.5 
(= 4) 45–54 years old 17 30.4  77 33.3  94 32.8 
(= 5) 55–64 years old 12 21.4  30 13.0  42 14.6 
(= 6) 65 years old or above 1 1.8  12 5.2  13 4.5 
Education level (EDU)
(= 1) Primary or below 10 17.9  30 13.0  40 13.9 
(= 2) Lower secondary 2 3.6  11 4.8  13 4.5 
(= 3) Upper secondary 15 26.8  61 26.4  76 26.5 
(= 4) Matriculation 6 10.7  34 25.5  40 13.9 
(= 5) Tertiary or above 23 41.1  95 41.1  118 41.1 
Average monthly household income (INC)
(= 1) Below HKD 5,000 2 3.6  7 3.0  9 3.1 
(= 2) HKD 5,000–HKD 9,999 2 3.6  8 3.5  10 3.5 
(= 3) HKD 10,000–HKD 14,999 3 5.4  15 6.5  18 6.3 
(= 4) HKD 15,000–HKD 19,999 5 8.9  18 7.8  23 8.0 
(= 5) HKD 20,000–HKD 24,999 4 7.1  28 12.1  32 11.1 
(= 6) HKD 25,000–HKD 29,999 15 26.8  64 27.7  79 27.5 
(= 7) HKD 30,000–HKD 34,999 6 10.7  39 16.9  45 15.7 
(= 8) HKD 35,000–HKD 39,999 7 12.5  24 10.4  31 10.8 
(= 9) HKD 40,000 or above 11 19.6  24 10.4  35 12.2 
(NA) Refuse to answer 1 1.8  4 1.7  5 1.7 
Ethnicity (LOC)
(= 1) Chinese that were born or grew up locally 51 91.8  200 86.6  251 87.5 
(= 0) New immigrants from mainland China 3 5.4  14 6.1  17 5.9 
(= 0) Other ethnic groups 1 1.8  15 6.5  16 5.6 
(NA) Refuse to answer 1 1.8  2 0.9  3 1.0 
Number of cohabiting family members (FAM)
(= 1) One 4 7.1  8 3.5  12 4.2 
(= 2) Two 5 8.9  26 11.3  31 10.8 
(= 3) Three 14 25.0  64 27.7  78 27.2 
(= 4) Four 21 37.5  97 42.0  118 41.1 
(= 5) Five 10 17.9  26 11.3  36 12.5 
(= 6) Six or above 2 3.6  10 4.3  12 4.2 
Total 56 100.0  231 100.0  287 100.0 
Note: (*) Values in parentheses denote input values for the respective categorical or dummy variables for the subsequent ordered probit analysis.
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cial housing. To bridge the gap, this study explores the serious‑
ness of ASB in non‑social housing perceived by the residents.
3  Seriousness of ASB problems in 
Hong Kong’s private housing
3.1  Survey design and profile of the respondents
Opinions from private‑housing residents were collected 
through a self‑administered face‑to‑face structured question‑
naire survey conducted between April and June 2011. This 
approach was used with an eye to gaining the highest possi‑
ble number of participants in the survey. A questionnaire was 
devised to collect the information necessary for the empirical 
study. Before the survey, the present questionnaire had been 
pretested and amended according to the testers’ feedbacks. A 
total of 287 residents living in private housing in the Tai Po 
and Shatin districts were interviewed. Figures 1a and 1b show 
two housing estates in which some of the respondents lived.
Table 1 presents the socio‑demographic profile of the respond‑
ents. On average, the respondents had been living in public 
housing for 14.8 years at the time of interview. Most respond‑
ents belonged to the high‑ and middle‑income class because 
more than 75% of the respondents had a monthly household 
income in excess of HKD 17,250, the median monthly domes‑
tic household income of the entire population in Hong Kong 
in 2006 (Census and Statistics Department, 2007). About half 
of the respondents were below 45 years old. Those with a ter‑
tiary education (including a bachelor’s degree or higher cer‑
tificate) or above accounted for 41.1% of the respondents. The 
sample was dominated by households with three to four mem‑
bers (41.8%). Thirty‑three respondents (11.5%) were either 
non‑Chinese or new immigrants from mainland China. As 
far as housing tenure is concerned, 231 respondents (80.5%) 
were owner‑occupiers. Over half of the respondents (58.2%) 
lived in estate‑type housing, with another 98  (34.1%) and 
22  (7.7%) living in single‑block developments and village 
houses, respectively.
3.2  Perceived seriousness and causes of ASB 
problems
In the face‑to‑face interviews, the respondents were asked 
whether they agreed that a specific type of ASB was serious in 
their residential developments on a five‑point scale (with 5 = 
strongly agree and 1 = strongly disagree). As shown in Ta‑
ble 2, “noise nuisances” was the most frequent cited ASB by 
the respondents, followed by “litter or rubbish” and “unre‑
paired drainage or water seepage”. Among the twelve problems 
studied, “dripping water” and “waste accumulation” were not 
considered serious ASB problems because their mean scores 
were below three.
Moreover, the respondents were asked about their perceived 
causes of the neighbourhood problems in their housing de‑
velopments. Again, the answer was measured on a five‑point 
Likert scale (with 5 = strongly agree and 1 = strongly disagree), 
and Table 3 summarises the findings. In the opinion of the 
respondents, “ineffective policing or management” was con‑
sidered the main case of ASB problems in their living places. 
The mean score returned for that cause was 3.92, which was 
the highest among the causes. Second and third to “ineffec‑
tive policing or management” were “poor parenting” (mean = 
3.78) and “mental illness or disorder” (mean = 3.63), respec‑
tively. On the other hand, “alcohol or drugs” (mean = 2.38) 
and “unemployment” (mean = 2.75) were regarded as the least 
relevant causes of ASB problems.
From the above, it is clear that the respondents regarded effec‑
tive housing management as an important counterforce against 
ASB in private housing. Moreover, poor parenting was con‑
sidered one of the main causes of ASB problems in private 
Table 2: Perceived seriousness of specific ASB problems (n = 287)
Problem Mean σ
Noisy nuisances 3.72 0.96
Litter or rubbish 3.68 0.87
Unrepaired drainage or water seepage 3.57 0.96
Abusive uses of communal space or facility 3.53 0.93
Objects thrown from a height 3.41 0.90
Vandalism or graffiti 3.28 0.87
Illegal dealings 3.21 0.97
Uncontrolled dogs 3.18 0.94
Gangsters 3.10 1.01
Burglary 3.09 0.91
Dripping water 2.99 0.96
Waste accumulation 2.89 1.11
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housing in Hong Kong. This finding echoes those by other 
researchers (Millie et al., 2005; Ipsos MORI, 2006) in which 
poor parenting was also found to be the most imperative cause 
of ASB in the United Kingdom. Similarly, this author (Yau, 
2011b) also found that poor parenting contributed a great 
deal to ASB problems in public housing in Hong Kong. As 
he explained, long working hours and lack of community sup‑
port of the parents were conducive to this predicament. In 
light of these findings, the local government should offer more 
community services to support working parents through child 
custody and youth development.
4  Level of intolerance towards ASB 
and its determinants
To determine who is intolerant of ASB problems in living plac‑
es, multivariate analysis of the survey data was performed. In 
the structured questionnaire survey, each respondent was asked 
whether he or she agreed that ASB problems or neighbour‑
hood nuisances in his or her housing development were very se‑
rious and intolerable. The respondent had to express his or her 
answer using a five‑point Likert scale (with 5 = strongly agree 
and 1 = strongly disagree). A higher score indicates a higher 
level of intolerance of the respondent to ASB problems in the 
place of residence. Among the 287 respondents, 99 (34.5%) 
stated that ASB problems in their housing developments were 
intolerable, whereas 115 (40.1%) thought the opposite.
It is hypothesised that the levels of intolerance (INT) of a 
respondent are functions of a number of socio‑demographic 
factors of the respondent such as gender (MAL), age (AGE), 
education level (EDU), household income (INC) and ethnic‑
ity (LOC), and housing experience and characteristics such as 
length of residence in public housing (LOR), number of cohab‑
iting family members (FAM), residential satisfaction (SAT) 
and type of housing he or she is living in (TYP). Mathemati‑
cally (Equation 1),
Table 3: Perceived causes of ASB in housing (n = 287)
Problem Mean σ
Ineffective policing or management 3.92 0.86
Poor parenting 3.78 0.88
Mental illness or disorder 3.63 0.91
Poor discipline at school 3.58 0.98
Boredom 3.31 0.77
Unemployment 2.75 0.82
Alcohol or drugs 2.38 0.99
INT = α1MAL + α2AGE + α3EDU + α4INC + α5LOR +
           α6LOC + α7FAM + α8SAT + α9TYP + α10OWN + e
where ai (for i = 1, 2, … , 10) are coefficients to be estimated, 
and e is the stochastic term. LOR stands for the respondent’s 
length of residence, measured in years, in the current housing 
development. SAT denotes the respondent’s satisfaction with 
the overall quality of his or her housing development, and is 
measured on a five‑point scale (with 5 = very satisfied and 
1 = very dissatisfied). TYP is a dummy variable that equals 1 
if the respondent was living in a high‑rise apartment building, 
and 0 if otherwise. OWN is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
the respondent was an owner‑occupier, and 0 if otherwise. For 
other dummy variables, their meanings and measurements are 
detailed in Table 1. Table 4 summarises the mean values of all 
variables in Equation 1. Because the dependent variable INT 
is ordinal in nature, an ordered probit technique can return 
a more robust model estimation compared with the conven‑
tional ordinary least squares technique. After truncation of the 
missing data, 280 observations were included in the analyses. 
The estimation results for Equation 1 are presented in Table 5.
The estimated coefficients of the variables MAL and EDU are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Coefficients that are 
significant at the 5% level are returned for the variables LOR 
and TYP. The coefficient of the variable FAM is marginally 
significant at the 10% level. On the other hand, age (AGE), 
household income (INC), ethnicity (LOC), residential satis‑
faction (SAT) and housing tenure (OWN) do not show any 
significant impact on the level of intolerance, even at the 10% 
level. As implied from the estimation results, male respond‑
ents were less tolerant of the prevailing ASB problems in their 
housing developments, ceteris paribus. Moreover, residential 
satisfaction did not exert any significant impacts on the level 
of intolerance. Surprisingly, these findings contradict another 
study on public housing (Yau, 2011b) that found that males 
were more able to endure ASB problems and that the level of 
intolerance increased with residential dissatisfaction.
As suggested by the respective positive and negative signs for 
the coefficients of the variables EDU and LOR, respondents 
that were better educated and had a shorter duration of resi‑
dence were more likely to think that ASB problems in their 
places of living were intolerable. Moreover, respondents liv‑
ing in high‑rise housing tended to be more intolerant of ASB 
Y. YAU
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problems compared with those residing in village houses. This 
association is self‑explanatory. The living environment in pri‑
vate high‑rises in Hong Kong is more densely populated and so 
the misbehaviour of a resident can affect many other residents 
in a more direct manner. For example, accumulation of waste 
in an apartment unit can easily cause the people living nearby 
to suffer from the odour and unhygienic conditions. In addi‑
tion, as an aftermath of the painful lesson of the 2003 SARS 
outbreak, people in Hong Kong became more aware of the 
dreadful consequences of a poor‑quality living environment, 
particularly in high‑rise housing. Therefore, ASB is less toler‑
able for residents in high‑rise housing in the city.
5  Difficulties in managing ASB in 
private housing
As discussed above, most respondents ascribed the prolifera‑
tion of ASB to ineffective policing or management, implying 
that proper housing management was thought to alleviate ASB 
problems. However, managing ASB in non‑social housing is 
not straightforward compared to the case in social housing. 
In social or public housing, tenants’ behaviour is usually regu‑
lated by social landlords through strict tenancy control. On the 
premise of welfare conditionality, a tenant can be evicted from 
social housing for repeated incidents of ASB or unacceptable 
behaviour (Yau, 2011a). Alternatively, to encourage responsi‑
ble behaviour by tenants, some social landlords offer incen‑
tives such as priority maintenance, gardening kits or shopping 
vouchers to tenants that have not received any complaints for a 
specific period of time (Lupton et al., 2003; Jacobs et al., 2005; 
Jacobs, 2008). In the private rental sector, the main way to con‑
trol ASB is through the terms and conditions of the tenancy 
agreements (Wright, 2011). Although powerful sanctions like 
lease termination are available to private landlords, landlords 
seldom make resort to such means because lease termination 
can result in voids, reducing their rental incomes. Termina‑
tion of tenancy is sought if the nuisances or ASB adversely 
Table 4: Mean responses for the variables for the ordered probit analysis
Variable Range Mean σ
INT 5 = strongly agree … 1 = strongly disagree 2.92 0.27
MAL 1 = male; 0 = female  0.61 0.49
AGE 6 = 65 years old or above … 1 = 18–24 years old 3.49 1.22
EDU 5 = tertiary or above … 1 = primary or below 3.64 1.41
INC 9 = HKD 40,000 or above … 1 = below HKD 5,000 5.98 2.03
LOR 28 years … 1 years 14.82 7.90
LOC 1 = Chinese that was born or grew up locally; 0 = others 0.88 0.32
FAM 6 = six or above … 1 = one 3.60 1.10
SAT 5 = strongly satisfied … 1 = strongly dissatisfied 3.08 0.87
TYP 1 = living in high-rise housing; 0 = living in a village house 0.92 0.27
OWN 1 = owner-occupier; 0 = tenant 0.80 0.40
Table 5: Estimation results of the ordered probit analysis on the level of intolerance
Variable Standard error z-statistic p-value 
MAL 0.1322 4.1867 0.0000
AGE 0.0645 −0.9523 0.3409
EDU 0.0494 7.1892 0.0000
INC 0.0362 0.5404 0.5889
LOR 0.0114 −2.0021 0.0453
LOC 0.2463 −0.8411 0.4003
FAM 0.0673 −1.7223 0.0850
SAT 0.0756 0.9163 0.3595
TYP 0.2238 1.9861 0.0470
OWN 0.2172 0.0235 0.9812
Dependent variable: INT Number of observations: 280
Pseudo R-squared: 0.1001 Schwarz criterion: 3.1456
Akaike info criterion: 2.9638 Hannan–Quinn criterion: 3.0367
LR statistic: 89.2218 p (LR statistic): 0.0000
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affects the rentals by creating a bad reputation for the proper‑
ties concerned.
Even worse, many residents in the private sector in Hong Kong 
are owner‑occupiers. For this group of residents, eviction can 
represent an infringement of the right to private property. 
Virtually, the only remedies available in non‑social housing 
are reporting the cases to the authorities (e.g., the police, the 
Environmental Protection Department and the Food and En‑
vironmental Hygiene Department) and asking the court for 
injunctions. Certainly, complaints can be lodged to housing 
managers, but their power to deal with ASB issues is limited. 
Even worse, the bidirectional relationship between housing 
managers and owner‑occupiers makes managers hesitate to 
intervene in disputes between neighbours arising from ASB. 
On the one hand, a housing manager is supposed to protect 
the rights and interests of the co‑owners in a private residen‑
tial development. The manager is delegated the power to en‑
force the deed of mutual covenant (DMC), which is a legal 
document setting out the rights, interests and obligations of 
co‑owners, residents and housing managers of a multi‑owned 
development with respect to the control, maintenance and 
management of the development (Home Affairs Department, 
2001). One the other hand, in principle the manager is jointly 
appointed by all the co‑owners in the development. Therefore, 
the manager regulates the behaviour of the co‑owners but, at 
the same time, is the agent for all the co‑owners. Handling 
disputes between neighbours often makes one party happy and 
the other party upset.
At the same time, although housing managers are the “en‑
forcer” of the DMC, they have no power to penalise the per‑
petrators. In case of ASB, managers must rely on the legal 
system for remedies (e.g., injunctions against perpetrators or 
claiming damages from perpetrators). Nonetheless, the litiga‑
tion process is very often lengthy and consumes resources. 
Therefore, the difficult position of housing managers makes 
them reluctant to get involved in ASB and disputes between 
neighbours. Housing managers tend to stay away from such 
matters unless they affect a significant number of residents. 
This is vividly reflected in the survey results. For respondents 
that had lodged complaints about ASB to housing manag‑
ers, only 22% thought that the housing managers could help 
them solve the ASB or nuisances concerned, which mainly 
affected only the complainants. On the other hand, 67% of 
this group of respondents felt that the housing managers could 
end or lessen the ASB effectively after receiving the complaints 
if the ASB in question affected many residents in their devel‑
opments.
6  Conclusion and agenda for further 
research
Neighbourhood nuisances and ASB problems in housing have 
long been creating many troubles for local residents and gov‑
ernments globally, but much attention is placed on social or 
public housing. This unbalanced focus is perhaps a result of 
the marginalisation of social housing (Forrest & Murie, 1988; 
Malpass, 1990). However, whether the issue does not exist in 
other types of tenure or is simply ignored remains unanswered. 
In fact, the Labour Party (1995: 7) acknowledged that “plenty 
of those guilty of antisocial behaviour are private tenants or 
owner occupiers”. Therefore, this article contributes to the 
body of knowledge by exploring the views of 287 residents in 
private housing in Hong Kong towards the neighbourhood 
problems in their places of residence. As indicated by the sur‑
vey findings of this study, private‑housing residents complain 
about serious neighbourhood problems such as noise nuisances 
and littering. In addition, multivariate analysis reveals that 
residents with higher education levels, with shorter lengths 
of residence and living in high‑rise housing were less tolerant 
to ASB problems in their living places. Moreover, although 
tackling ASB in private housing depends on the willingness 
of neighbours and the community to report the behaviour to 
the proper agencies (Wright, 2011), most respondents thought 
that their housing managers could not handle their complaints 
about ASB properly.
Although this study has its limitations, such as a small sample 
size, it may stimulate a new wave of research on ASB or neigh‑
bourhood nuisances in various types of housing. Perhaps, when 
determining directions for further studies, scholars will focus 
on why certain types of ASB (e.g., noise nuisances) persist and 
which measures are effective in controlling the problem. As a 
matter of fact, these issues can be investigated from a transac‑
tion cost perspective. For example, litter or rubbish has been 
perceived one of the most serious misdeeds in this study and 
many others (e.g., Lovbakke, 2007; Innes, 2011; Yau, 2011b). 
This is likely because the costs of enforcement (including rule 
setting, violation identification and evidence gathering) are 
very high. As one can image, it is difficult to prove whether a 
lump of rubbish in the corridor was disposed by a particular 
household unless the disposal was witnessed by someone. Fol‑
lowing the same logic, control measures incurring prohibitively 
high transaction costs (e.g., use of statutory ASB orders) fail 
to tackle the nuisance problem.
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